Showing posts with label Alabama Statutory Laws. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Alabama Statutory Laws. Show all posts

Saturday, July 4, 2009

Alabama Dept. Of Forensic Sciences Breath Test Rules

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

CHAPTER 370‑1‑1 CHEMICAL TEST FOR INTOXICATION


TABLE OF CONTENTS


370‑1‑1‑.01 Admissibility Rule For The Evidential Breath Alcohol Test Method
370‑1‑1‑.02 Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument Inspections (Repealed 8/11/03)
370‑1‑1‑.03 Blood, Urine, And Other Bodily Substances
370‑1‑1‑.04 Field Sobriety Screening Tests
370‑1‑1‑.05 Field Sobriety Screening Devices
Appendix



370‑1‑1‑.01 Admissibility Rule For The Evidential Breath Alcohol Test Method.

(1) Purpose. This rule addresses the statutory elements required for the admissibility of evidence obtained from Breath Alcohol Testing Instruments. This rule contains the METHOD, as referred to by §32‑5A‑194 Code of Ala. 1975, as amended, which insures and verifies that each individual Breath Alcohol Test is performed accurately and reliably. IN EVENT THAT ONE OF THESE REQUIREMENTS IS NOT FULFILLED, BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING EVIDENCE MAY STILL BE OFFERED THROUGH TRADITIONAL EVIDENTIARY PREDICATE as approved of in Ex parte Mayo, 652 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 1994).

(2) Definitions and Abbreviations.

(a) Acceptable Breath Sample. For the purpose of this rule the subject must provide the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII with a breath sample of sufficient volume and duration, as required by the software to be accepted for analysis. Software versions prior to and including version 3.24 require the subject to provide a minimum of 1.5 liters of breath, for a minimum of 4.5 seconds. Software versions 3.25 or later require the subject to provide a minimum of 1.3 liters of breath, for a minimum of 4.0 seconds.

(b) Accuracy Check Fail. When the Calibration Check results are outside the programmed parameters of the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII, the instrument will abort the testing sequence.

(c) Admin. Breath Temperature Correction. Administrative Breath Temperature Correction can result in an administrative lowering of the reported Breath Alcohol Result. When the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII determines a subject’s Breath Temperature is not 34.0oC an adjustment to the reported value will be made. When the Breath Temperature is above 34.0oC the adjustment will result in a lower reported Breath Alcohol Concentration.

(d) Alcohol. For the purpose of this rule, use of the term alcohol shall refer to ethanol or ethyl alcohol unless otherwise specified.

(e) Air Blank Check. The Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument verifies that the analytical pathway is free of contamination.

(f) Ambient Air Check. The Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument verifies that the air used to purge the analytical pathway was free of contamination.

(g) Ambient Air Fail. The Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII will terminate a Breath Testing Sequence when the detector systems respond to ethanol or other substances in the room air.

(h) Blowing Not Allowed. Only when the “PLEASE BLOW” message appears will the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII accept a subject breath sample. Any breath sample provided to the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII at any time other than when prompted to do so will not be accepted by the instrument.

(i) Blowing Time Too Short. When a breath sample is provided to the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII that is sufficient in volume but deficient in duration, as required by the software, the instrument will not accept the sample.

(j) Br‑Temp Meas Not Ok. Breath Temperature Measurement Not Ok occurs when the difference between the two Breath Temperature thermistor values is outside the specified range for a single breath sample.

(k) Breath Alcohol Test. For the purpose of this rule, two (2) acceptable breath samples in conjunction with two diagnostic checks and two acceptable calibration checks shall constitute a Breath Alcohol Test.

(l) Calibration. The purpose of the calibration is to define the appropriate parameters to allow the instrument to accurately quantitate alcohol in a breath sample. The Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII does not calibrate itself at the time of the test; calibration is performed at the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences laboratory and subsequently verified at the time of the test with dry gas standards.

(m) Calibration Check. For the purpose of this rule, a calibration check is the automated process whereby the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII samples and tests a known dry gas standard to verify the instrument's acceptable calibration.

(n) Certificate of Analysis. For the purpose of this rule, the Certificate of Analysis is the document generated by the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII for introduction of Breath Alcohol Test results to the Courts. By design, when the Certificate of Analysis indicates a numerical value for the subject’s Breath Alcohol Concentration, the Certificate of Analysis is confirmation of successful method completion.

(o) Chemical Analysis. For the purpose of this rule, chemical analysis is the separation of a substance into its constituent elements to determine either their nature or their portions. The goal as set forth in §32‑5A‑194 Code of Ala. 1975, as amended, is the chemical analyses of a person's breath to determine the presence and quantity of alcohol (ethanol).

(p) Data Pack. The Data Pack contains the supporting data for the Certificate of Analysis as referred to at the bottom of that document. By design, the Data Pack along with the Subject Mis‑Try file, and when needed the IR Curves, EC Profile Plot, and Flow Profile Plot, constitute “…full information concerning the test or tests shall be made available to him or his attorney…” as referred to by §32‑5A‑194(a)(4) Code of Ala. 1975, as amended.

(q) Draeger. For the purpose of this rule, Draeger is the appropriate English translation of the German name Dräger.

(r) Deprivation Period. For the purpose of the METHOD as referred to by §32‑5A‑194 Code of Ala. 1975, as amended, prior to submitting to a Breath Alcohol Test a person should not be allowed to put anything in their mouth for at least 20 minutes.

(s) EC. For the purpose of this rule, EC will be the abbreviation for the electrochemical cell detector utilized by the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII.

(t) EC Profile Plot. For the purpose of this rule, the EC Profile Plot is a plot utilized by the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII that depicts EC Detector signal for a given breath sample.

(u) Flow Profile Plot. For the purpose of this rule, the Flow Profile Plot is a plot utilized by the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII that depicts breath sample flow into the instrument.

(v) Forensic Edits. In the event an operator incorrectly input clerical data as requested by the Breath Alcohol Testing method, this information can be corrected by the following procedure: the operator should strike through the incorrect data (preferably a single strike leaving the original data legible), insert the correct data, and initial and date the correction.

(w) Interference. When the detector systems of the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII respond to a substance other than alcohol (ethanol, ethyl alcohol), the instrument will terminate the test.

(x) IR. For the purpose of this rule, IR will be the abbreviation for the infrared detector utilized by the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MK III.

(y) IR Curve. For the purpose of this rule, the IR Curve is a plot of the infrared detector data utilized by the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MK III for a given breath sample.

(z) Method. For the purpose of this rule a method is an orderly and systematic approach to accomplishing a goal. The goal as set forth in §32‑5A‑194 Code of Ala. 1975, as amended, is the chemical analyses of a person's breath to determine the presence and quantity of alcohol (ethanol). Therefore the method refers only to those tasks, manual or automated, which occur at the time of the breath test and result in accurately identifying and quantifying the amount of alcohol on a particular person’s breath. The method in its entirety is performed and confirmed at the time of the breath test.

(aa) Minimum Volume Not Achieved. When a breath sample is provided to the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII that is deficient in volume, as required by the software, the instrument will reject the sample.

(ab) Mouth Alcohol. When a breath sample contains a measurable amount of alcohol originating from the mouth, and is higher in concentration than the end expiratory air, the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII will determine the sample to contain residual mouth alcohol. Once the presence of residual mouth alcohol has been determined the instrument will suspend the testing sequence for twenty (20) minutes. The testing sequence will resume at the end of the twenty‑minute wait preserving all clerical data entries.

(ac) Out of Measuring Range. When the alcohol concentration of a breath sample exceeds 0.45 g/210L the instrument will abort the testing sequence.

(ad) Operator. For the purpose of this rule, an operator is an employee of a law enforcement agency possessing a valid permit (active permit number) and who is in control of the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII during a testing sequence. The operator also acts as a “FACT” witness with regard to instrument operation in any litigation arising from the breath test. As stated by the Court in Stubstad v. City of Orange Beach, 575 So.2d 1240 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991), the operator need not be an expert on the mechanical functioning of the instrument.

(ae) Permit. For the purpose of this rule, a permit is an electronic mechanism for controlling access to a Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument through a unique operator permit number. Confirmation of an operator's active status as well as pending expiration date is designated on the Certificate of Analysis.

(af) Purging. The Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument cycles fresh air through the instrument analysis path to cleanse the pathway of the last sample analyzed.

(ag) Refusal. The operator may elect to end an incomplete test by declaring the subject has refused to provide two complete and acceptable samples. Refusal indicates the operator believes the subject to be intentionally obstructing the collection of evidence via the breath sample. The Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument cannot make the decision for the operator that any unacceptable subject breath sample or sequence of unacceptable subject breath samples constitutes a subject refusal. After each unacceptable subject breath sample the operator has the opportunity to determine by which of the following three options the testing sequence will proceed: <1> REFUSAL <2> UNABLE <3> RESTART TEST. In event circumstances require abruptly ending the testing sequence with a refusal, the operator may select at the "PLEASE BLOW" prompt.

(ah) Standard Gas Supply. Failure of one of the two dry gas samples to be delivered to the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII for analysis will result in the termination of the testing sequence.

(ai) Subject “Mis‑Try”. A subject “Mis‑Try” is a breath sample that failed to meet the acceptable criteria as determined by the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII. A record of the attempted breath sample is preserved in the Subject “Mis‑Try” file.

(aj) Unable. The operator may elect to end an incomplete test by declaring the subject is unable to provide two complete and acceptable samples. Unable indicates the operator believes the subject to be incapable of providing the required breath sample and thereby is not intentionally obstructing the collection of evidence via the breath sample. The Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument cannot assess the subject’s physical condition for the operator. After each unacceptable subject breath sample the operator has the opportunity to determine by which of the following three options the testing sequence will proceed: <1> REFUSAL <2> UNABLE <3> RESTART TEST.

(3) Approved Evidential Breath Alcohol Instrument List.

(a) Alcotest 7110 MKIII, Draeger Safety, Inc., Durango CO. For the purpose of this rule, variations or enhancements that do not have any bearing on the alcohol measuring capability of the instrument, such as the addition of a modem designated as an Alcotest 7110 MKIII C, are approved.

(4) Approved Evidential Breath Alcohol Test Method.

(a) The method of operation of the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII is software driven and controlled so as not to be influenced by operator technique. The method requires the operator to input the following clerical data (steps 1‑18) as prompted. It is appropriate for the operator to enter a “‑“ for steps 6.(i), 6.(ii), 6(iii), 6.(iv), 6.(v), and 10 ‑ 16 when the requested information cannot be obtained. Omission of an entry in any field will prevent the completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing method.

1. PERMIT NO. (NUMBER): The operator must enter and confirm his/her unique Draeger permit number.

2. <1> DUI <2> ADMIN <3> DEMO: The operator must select the type of testing routine to be administered to the subject.

3. ENTER DRY GAS STND (STANDARD) #1 PRESSURE: The operator must observe and record the pressure from the gas regulator gauge on dry gas standard #1 (0.020 g/210L ethanol standard). It should be noted that the gas pressure has no bearing on the analytical result obtained from the DUI testing routine.

4. ENTER DRY GAS STND (STANDARD) #2 PRESSURE: The operator must observe and record the pressure from the gas regulator gauge on dry gas standard #2 (0.080 g/210L ethanol standard). It should be noted that the gas pressure has no bearing on the analytical result obtained from the DUI testing routine.

5. 20 MIN (MINUTE) DEPRIVATION PERIOD: The operator must confirm that the subject has been under the control of the arresting officer, the operator, and/or other employee of a law enforcement agency for a minimum of 20 minutes. Enter “Y” for yes or “N” for no.

6. ARREST OFFICER SAME AS OPERATOR: The operator must designate whether the breath test operator is or is not the arresting officer. Enter “Y” for yes or “N” for no. If the arresting officer is not the breath test operator then the following information identifying the arresting officer will also be required.

(i) ARREST OFFICERS LAST NAME: The operator must enter the last name of the arresting officer.

(ii) ARREST OFFICERS FIRST NAME: The operator must enter the first name of the arresting officer.

(iii) ARREST OFFICERS MIDDLE INITIAL: The operator must enter the middle initial of the arresting officer.

(iv) ARREST OFFICERS IDENTIFICATION NUMBER: The operator must enter the agency identification number of the arresting officer.

(v) ARREST OFFICERS AGENCY: The operator must enter the agency of the arresting officer.

7. TIME OF OFFENSE: The operator must enter the date and time of the offense using the following format .

8. COUNTY OF OFFENSE: The operator must enter the county in which the offense occurred.

9. SUBJECT’S UTC (UNIFORM TRAFFIC COMPLAINT NUMBER): The operator must enter the subject’s Uniform Traffic Complaint number.

10. SUBJECT LAST NAME: The operator must enter the subject’s last name.

11. SUBJECT FIRST NAME: The operator must enter the subject’s first name.

12. SUBJECT MIDDLE INIT (INITIAL): The operator must enter the subject’s middle initial.

13. SUBJECT STREET ADDR/APT (ADDRESS/APARTMENT): The operator must enter the subject’s street or apartment address.

14. SUBJECT TOWN/CITY: The operator must enter the subject’s town or city of residence.

15. SUBJECT STATE: The operator must enter the subject’s state of residence using appropriate two‑letter designation.

16. SUBJECT DL# (DRIVER’S LICENSE NUMBER) OR SS# (SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER): The operator must enter the subject’s driver’s license number, Alabama file number, social security number or Alabama I.D. number.

17. SUBJECT (MALE/FEMALE): The operator must designate the subject’s gender using “M” for male and “F” for female.

18. SUBJECT DOB (DATE OF BIRTH): The operator must designate the subject’s date of birth using the format . An entry of 01/01/1900 will be used when the subject’s date of birth cannot be obtained.

(b) Upon completion of clerical data entry the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII continues the Breath Alcohol Testing method by performing or displaying the following automated steps or messages.

1. PURGING

2. AMBIENT AIR CHECK

3. AIR BLANK CHECK

4. ACCURACY CHECK (0.020 g/210L)

5. PURGING

6. AMBIENT AIR CHECK

7. AIR BLANK CHECK

8. INSERT MOUTHPIECE, PRESS BUTTON (Operator Task)

9. PLEASE WAIT

10. PLEASE BLOW (First Subject Sample)

11. STOP

12. REMOVE MOUTHPIECE

13. PURGING

14. AMBIENT AIR CHECK

15. AIR BLANK CHECK

16. PLEASE WAIT

17. PURGING

18. AMBIENT AIR CHECK

19. AIR BLANK CHECK

20. INSERT MOUTHPIECE, PRESS BUTTON (Operator Task)

21. PLEASE WAIT

22. PLEASE BLOW (Second Subject Sample)

23. STOP

24. REMOVE MOUTHPIECE

25. PURGING

26. AMBIENT AIR CHECK

27. AIR BLANK CHECK

28. ACCURACY CHECK (0.080 g/210L)

29. PURGING

30. AMBIENT AIR CHECK

31. AIR BLANK CHECK

32. RESULT

33. DATA STORED

(5) Report of Breath Alcohol Test Result.

(a) The Certificate of Analysis produced for each individual Breath Alcohol Test is confirmation of successful METHOD completion when an analytical result (number) is obtained. For a Breath Alcohol Test result to be reported, indicating successful METHOD completion, the following steps must be performed.

1. “DIAGNOSTIC CHECKS BEFORE AND AFTER OK”: An automated internal diagnostic check is performed by the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII one hundred twenty eight (128) times per second. For each Breath Alcohol Test, the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII stores in memory a record of a single diagnostic “Snap Shot” before the first subject sample is collected and after the second subject sample is collected.

2. “CALIBRATION CHECKS BEFORE AND AFTER OK”: An automated calibration check is performed before the first subject sample is collected and after the second subject sample is collected to verify the calibration of the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII at the time of the breath test. A 0.020 g/210L ethanol standard is introduced into the instrument before the first subject sample is collected. An acceptable result of 0.015 to 0.025 g/210L will allow the Breath Alcohol Test to proceed. A 0.080 g/210L ethanol standard is introduced into the instrument after the second subject sample is collected. An acceptable result of 0.076 to 0.084 g/210L must be obtained before the results of the Breath Alcohol Test will be reported. When results obtained from the calibration checks are not within the stated acceptable ranges, the “Certificate of Analysis” obtained from the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII will indicate ACCURACY CHECK FAIL and no numerical result will be reported at the time of the breath test..

3. "INSPECTION BEFORE AND AFTER TEST OK": Completed Diagnostic Checks and Calibration Checks verify instrument accuracy and reliability and therefore constitute a time of test inspection. When a condition exist which prevents the completion of either the diagnostic checks or the calibration checks the "Certificate of Analysis" will not bear this statement.

4. “THE SUBJECT MUST COMPLETE A DEPRIVATION PERIOD OF AT LEAST TWENTY MINUTES BEFORE PROVIDING THE FIRST BREATH SAMPLE”. An operator must attest that reasonable efforts were made by an employee of a law enforcement agency to deprive the subject of putting potentially interfering substances in their mouth. In event the operator becomes aware of potentially interfering substances in the mouth, the deprivation period should be restarted.

5. “TWO ACCEPTABLE BREATH SAMPLES WERE ANALYZED, THE LOWEST RESULT IS REPORTED”. The subject must provide two acceptable breath samples for analysis. The lowest alcohol result generated from each breath sample must agree within 0.020 g/210L of breath. If the alcohol results from the two breath samples do not agree within 0.020 g/210L of breath, the instrument will begin a second breath sample collection sequence. Failure to provide two (2) acceptable breath samples for the second breath sampling sequence will constitute a refusal of the whole test. When the results of two acceptable breath samples do agree within 0.020 g/210L of breath, the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII will report the lowest result truncated to the second decimal place.

6. When the subject provides a breath sample that does not meet the minimum acceptable criteria or when not prompted to do so, one of the following errors will be recorded in the Subject “Mis‑Try” file: “Minimum Volume Not Achieved”, “Blowing Time Too Short”, or “Blowing Not Allowed”. When the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII determines a sample or samples to be unacceptable the operator has the opportunity to determine by which of the following three options the testing sequence will proceed: <1> REFUSAL <2> UNABLE <3> RESTART TEST.

(b) Four copies of the Certificate of Analysis will be generated each bearing the statement “SUPPORTING DATA FOR THIS DOCUMENT IS AVAILABLE UPON WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF FORENSIC SCIENCES, IMPLIED CONSENT SECTION”. The supporting data or information as referred to in §32‑5A‑194(a)(4) Code of Ala. 1975, as amended, for the Certificate of Analysis consists of the “Data Pack”, “Subject Mis‑Try File”, and when needed IR Curves, EC Profile Plot, and Flow Profile Plot.

(6) Qualifications: An applicant must satisfactorily complete a new operator's course in the operational procedures of the Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument and be an employee for one of the agencies listed in §32‑5A‑194, Code of Ala. 1975, as amended.

(7) Permits:

(a) Permits to perform a chemical analysis of a person's breath pursuant to §32‑5A‑194, Code of Ala. 1975, as amended, will be issued by the Director of the Department of Forensic Sciences upon the recommendation of the Technical Director of the Implied Consent Section of the Department of Forensic Sciences.

(b) Permits issued to new operators will automatically expire at the end of the succeeding calendar year.

(c) Operator permit status can remain active by satisfactorily completing a continuing education session each calendar year and by being an employee for one of the agencies listed in §32‑5A‑194, Code of Ala. 1975, as amended. The permit of an operator failing to complete a continuing education session any year after their new operator's course will automatically expire at the end of that calendar year.

(d) An operator who fails to attend a continuing education session may be reactivated provided they attend a continuing education session within two calendar years. Any operator who remains inactive for more than two successive calendar years must attend a new operator’s class to be reinstated.

(e) Any action or practice which is misleading or deceptive, or the violation of any of the rules of the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences promulgated under the provisions of §32‑5A‑194, Code of Ala. 1975, as amended, shall constitute grounds upon which the Director may revoke such permit.

(f) If the Director receives a complaint or has reason to believe that an operator is participating in misleading or deceptive practices, violating or has violated any of the rules, he shall notify the operator that a hearing to determine if the alleged infraction has occurred. The Director will designate a place and time for the hearing.

(g) The Director or his designee shall conduct the hearing.

(h) Upon revocation of a permit, the Director shall notify the operator, the operator's immediate superior and the Technical Director of the Implied Consent Section of the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences.

Relevant Cites:

Designated Instrument: Harper v. City of Troy, 467 So.2d 269 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985)

Method: McDaniel v. State, 706 So. 2d 1305, (Ala.Crim.App. 2001).

Predicate: Ex parte Mayo, 652 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 1994); Ex Parte Vizzina, 533 So.2d 269,271 (Ala. 1988); Ex Parte Bush, 474 So.2d 168 (Ala. 1985); Moore v. State, 442 So.2d 164, 167 (Ala.Cr.App.1983); Patton v. City of Decatur, 337 So.2d 321 (Ala.1976); McGough v. Slaughter, 395 So.2d 972, 977 (Ala.1981).

Testimony: Stubstad v. City of Orange Beach, 575 So.2d 1240 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991)
Author: Dale A. Carpenter, Mark A. Pevey, Gregory L. Turner
Statutory Authority: Code of Ala. 1975, §§32‑5A‑194, as amended.
History: New Rule: Filed December 7, 1994; effective January 11, 1995. Amended: Filed October 10, 1995; effective November 11, 1995. (This function was transferred by Act No. 88‑660 to the Department of Forensic Sciences, May 13, 1988.) Amended: Filed July 24, 1996; effective August 28, 1996. Amended: Filed December 4, 1998: effective January 8, 1999. Amended: Filed May 7, 1999; effective June 11, 1999. Amended: Filed July 7, 2003; effective August 11, 2003. Amended: Filed June 4, 2004; effective July 9, 2004.



370‑1‑1‑.02 Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument Inspections. (Repealed 8/11/03)
Author: Department of Forensic Sciences
Statutory Authority: Code of Ala. 1975, §§32‑5A‑194, as amended.
History: New Rule: Filed December 7, 1994; effective January 11, 1995. Amended: Filed October 10, 1995; effective November 11, 1995. (This function was transferred by Act No. 88‑660 to the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, May 13, 1988.) Amended: Filed July 24, 1996; effective August 28, 1996. Amended: Filed December 4, 1998; effective January 8, 1999. Amended: Filed May 7, 1999; effective June 11, 1999. Repealed ‑ Appendices A, B and D also: Filed July 7, 2003; effective August 11, 2003.



370‑1‑1‑.03 Blood, Urine And Other Bodily Substances.

(1) Purpose. This rule describes the statutory elements required for the admissibility of evidence obtained from chemical analyses of a person’s blood, urine, or other bodily substance. This rule contains the METHODS as referred to by §32‑5A‑194 Code of Ala. 1975, as amended, that insures and verifies each chemical analysis is performed accurately and reliably. IN THE EVENT THAT ONE OF THESE REQUIREMENTS IS NOT FULFILLED, CHEMICAL ANALYSIS EVIDENCE MAY STILL BE OFFERED THROUGH TRADITIONAL EVIDENTIARY PREDICATE as described in Powell v. State, 515 So.2d 140 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986).

(2) Definitions and Abbreviations:

(a) Alcohol‑ For the purpose of this rule, use of the term alcohol shall refer to ethanol or ethyl alcohol unless otherwise specified.

(b) Method‑ For the purpose of this rule, a method is an orderly and systematic approach to accomplishing a goal. The goal as set forth in §32‑5A‑194 Code of Ala. 1975, as amended, is the chemical analyses of a persons blood, urine or other bodily substance to determine the presence and quantity of alcohol (ethanol) or other chemical substances. Therefore the method refers only to those tasks, manual or automated, that result in accurately identifying and quantifying the amount of alcohol or other chemical substance in a particular person’s blood or urine.

(c) Permit‑ For the purpose of this rule, a permit is authorization by the Director allowing an employee to analyze blood, urine, or other bodily substances for alcohol, drugs, or other chemical entities. By assigning a qualified employee this particular task the Director has expressed authorization.

(3) Qualifications. Applicants for a permit to perform a chemical analysis of a person’s blood, urine, or other bodily substance pursuant to the Alabama Chemical Test for Intoxication Act shall meet the following requirements.

(a) Be employed as a Forensic Scientist by the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences and be assigned to the Toxicology Section or Implied Consent Section by the Director.

(b) Have been approved by the Toxicology Section Discipline Chief to perform analyses on blood, urine, or other bodily substance analyses for the purpose of identification and quantitation of alcohol and/or other drugs.

(4) Certification Permits.

(a) Permits to perform a chemical analysis of a person’s blood, urine, or other bodily substance pursuant to the Alabama Chemical Test for Intoxication Act will be issued by the Director and certified by the Toxicology Section Discipline Chief..

(b) Once issued, permits will remain effective concurrent with the term of employment of the individual. At the Directors discretion permits may be rescinded.

(5) Methods.

(a) Analysis of blood, urine, or other bodily substances for the presence of volatile compounds; such as alcohol (ethanol), shall be performed by Gas Chromatography utilizing internal standard headspace injection, in accordance with the Toxicology Section’s Standard Operating Procedure for that analysis.

(b) Analysis of blood, urine, or other bodily substances for drugs or other chemical substances will utilize a screening technology in conjunction with Gas Chromatography Mass Spectrometry confirmation, in accordance with the Toxicology Section’s Standard Operating Procedure for that analysis.
Authors: Dale A. Carpenter, Jack R. Kalin
Statutory Authority: Code of Ala. 1975, §32‑5A‑194, as amended.
History: New Rule: Filed December 7, 1994; effective January 11, 1995. Amended: Filed October 10, 1995; effective November 11, 1995. (This function was transferred by Act No. 88‑660 to the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, May 13, 1988.) Amended: Filed July 24, 1996; effective August 28, 1996. Amended: Filed July 7, 2003; effective August 11, 2003.



370‑1‑1‑.04 Field Sobriety Screening Tests.

(1) Purpose. This rule describes the approved TECHNIQUE (Procedure) as referred to by §32‑6‑49.13 Code of Ala. 1975, as amended, that insures each Field Sobriety Screening Test performed on an operator of a commercial vehicle is performed in a standardized and reliable fashion.

(2) Definitions and Abbreviations.

(a) Alcohol‑ For the purpose of this rule, use of the term alcohol shall refer to ethanol or ethyl alcohol unless otherwise specified.

(3) Approved Procedure. The test battery comprising the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN), One‑leg Stand (OLS), and Walk and Turn (WAT) Field Sobriety Tests as described and applied according to the DUI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Student Manual, Publication HS178, Transportation Safety Institute, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation in its June, 1992 or successor printings.

(4) Training Certificates. A certificate will be issued to each officer who successfully passes written and practical examinations during a minimum of 16 hours of Standardized Field Sobriety Test Training which included no less than two controlled drinking workshops using volunteer drinkers and wherein the administration and interpretation of the HGN, OLS, and WAT tests was presented.
Authors: Dale A. Carpenter, Mark A. Pevey, Gregory L. Turner
Statutory Authority: §32‑6‑49.13, as amended.
History: New Rule: Filed July 24, 1996; effective August 28, 1996. Amended: Filed July 7, 2003; effective August 11, 2003.



370‑1‑1‑.05 Field Sobriety Screening Devices.

(1) Purpose. This rule list the approved “FIELD BREATHALYZER or OTHER APPROVED DEVICE” as referred to by §32‑6‑49.13 Code of Ala. 1975, as amended. Additionally, this rule describes training requirements and minimal operational criteria necessary for accurate and reliable results.

(2) Definitions and Abbreviations:

(a) Alcohol. For the purpose of this rule, use of the term alcohol shall refer to ethanol or ethyl alcohol unless otherwise specified.

(b) Observation. For the purpose of this rule, use of the term observation shall mean to watch. Prior to the administration of a field sobriety screening test employing an approved field sobriety screening device a subject must be under the observation of the arresting officer for a period of not less than twenty minutes.

(3) Approved Training. Training afforded by the manufacturer of an approved device and/or training received as a part of the Alabama Preliminary Breath Testing Instrument course shall constitute approved training.

(4) Operation of Devices.

(a) Officers shall use the device according to the manufacturer’s operational procedure.

(b) Every subject must be under observation by the arresting officer for a period of twenty minutes before the screening device test is administered.

(5) Calibration. Calibration shall be checked every twelve (12) months. The device passes the calibration check if it renders a reading between 0.030 g/210L and 0.050 g/210L inclusive on a 0.040 g/210L percent standard delivered from either a wet bath simulator or a dry gas cylinder.

(6) Training and Calibration Records. It shall be the responsibility of each law enforcement agency to maintain permanent records documenting the training of each officer in the use of approved field sobriety screening devices and the annual calibration check results on each device in use by the law enforcement agency.

(7) Approved Field Sobriety Screening Device List.

NOTE: For the purpose of this rule, variations or enhancements that do not have any bearing on the alcohol measuring capability of the instrument, such as the addition of a modem, external printer or passive sampling systems are approved.

(a) Alco‑Sensor III (Device Model)
Intoximeters, Inc., Saint Louis, MO (Manufacturer)

(b) Alco‑Sensor IV (Device Model)
Intoximeters, Inc., Saint Louis, MO (Manufacturer)

(c) Alcotest 7410 (Device Model)
Draeger Safety, Inc., Durango CO (Manufacturer)

(d) Lifeloc FC‑10 (Device Model)
Lifeloc Technologies, Wheat Ridge, CO (Manufacturer)

(e) Lifeloc FC‑20 (Device Model)
Lifeloc Technologies, Wheat Ridge, CO (Manufacturer)

(f) Intoxilyzer 300 (Device Model)
CMI, Inc., Owensboro, KY (Manufacturer)

(g) S‑D2 (Device Model)
CMI, Inc., Owensboro, KY (Manufacturer)
Authors: Dale A. Carpenter, Mark A. Pevey, Gregory L. Turner
Statutory Authority: Code of Ala. 1975, §32‑6‑49.13, as amended.
History: New Rule: Filed July 24, 1996; effective August 28, 1996. Amended: Filed July 7, 2003; effective August 11, 2003.
Appendix A

Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing Quality Control.

Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to inform the public of the quality control or good laboratory practices that are utilized by the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences to support Breath Alcohol Testing in the field. The practices described in this section only demonstrate that each Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII is capable of performing as expected. The method as described in 370‑1‑1‑.01(4) is the only sequence of steps that isolates alcohol (ethanol) from a subject to accurately determine the amount. Subsequently the quality control built into the method is the only process that verifies a particular Breath Alcohol Test did indeed perform as expected. Since the authority derived from §32‑5A‑194 Code of Ala. 1975, as amended, is limited to a method to perform a chemical analysis to determine the alcoholic content of a subjects blood the following information pertaining to good laboratory practice does not constitute a rule.

(1) Pre‑installation Evaluation. Each Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII is evaluated by the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences Technical Director or his designee prior to being placed in operation. The evaluation will demonstrate the ability of each Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII to identify and flag specific conditions; as well as, verify the analytical integrity of the instrument.

(a) Purging Error. Place the instrument in the “Error Check” mode. Restrict the air flow into the ambient air inlet while the pump is running. This will prompt the instrument to display “Check Sampling Hose” and sound an audible alarm. Record pass if the message “Error Triggered, Test Okay” is printed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(b) Minimum Volume Not Achieved. Place the instrument in the “Error Check” mode. At the prompt “Please Blow”, deliver a deficient sample volume. Record pass if the message “Error Triggered, Test Okay” is printed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(c) Blowing Time Too Short. Place the instrument in the “Error Check” mode. At the prompt “Please Blow”, deliver a sample of sufficient volume and deficient duration. Record pass if the message “Error Triggered, Test Okay” is printed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(d) Blowing Not Allowed. Place the instrument in the “Error Check” mode. At any time other than when the instrument indicates “Please Blow” deliver a sample into the instrument. Record pass if the message “Error Triggered, Test Okay” is printed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(e) Ready To Blow Expired. Place the instrument in the “Error Check” mode. At the prompt “Please Blow” do not provide a sample. After three (3) minutes has elapsed this error will be triggered by the instrument. Record pass if the message “Error Triggered, Test Okay” is printed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(f) Ambient Air Check. Place the instrument in the “Error Check” mode. When the instrument begins to purge itself, direct an ethanol vapor (typically from a 0.020 g/210L dry gas cylinder) near the breath hose inlet, but not directly into the breath hose inlet. Record pass if the message “Error Triggered, Test Okay” is printed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(g) Interference. Place the instrument in the “Error Check” mode. Prepare a methanol control by adding 105 microliters of methanol to 500 milliliters of distilled water and dispense into a simulator. At the prompt “Please Blow”, deliver a sufficient sample into the instrument. Record pass if the message “Error Triggered, Test Okay” is printed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(h) Mouth Alcohol. Place the instrument in the “Error Check” mode. At the prompt “Please Blow” the evaluator should rinse his or her mouth with a common mouthwash containing ethanol, then deliver a sufficient sample into the instrument. Record pass if the message “Error Triggered, Test Okay” is printed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(i) Accuracy Check Fail. Place the instrument in the “Error Check” mode. Connect the 0.020 g/210L dry gas cylinder to the 0.080 g/210L gas port and initiate a test. Record pass if the message “Error Triggered, Test Okay” is printed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(j) Standard Gas Supply. Disconnect the dry gas cylinders from the instrument and initiate a test. Record pass if the message “Stnd Gas Supply” is displayed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(k) Outside +/‑ Tolerance. Initiate an administrative test sequence. At the prompt “Please Blow” deliver a sufficient sample. When prompted to deliver the second sample, deliver a sufficient sample which varies in concentration from the first by at least 0.021 g/ 210 L. Record pass if the message “Outside +/‑ Tol” is displayed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(l) No Admittance. The evaluator should attempt to initiate a restricted function without the use of an appropriate key. Record pass if the message “No Admittance” is displayed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(m) Linearity Check. Utilizing manufactured solutions prepare simulators with the following ethanol concentrations: 0.000g/210L, 0.020g/210L (+/‑ 0.005 g/210L), 0.040 g/210L (+/‑ 0.005 g/210L), 0.080 g/210L (+/‑ 5%), 0.120 g/210L (+/‑ 5%), 0.200 g/210L (+/‑ 5%), and 0.500 g/210L (+/‑ 5%). Place the instrument in the “Acc‑Check” mode. When instructed, connect the appropriate simulator to the instrument. Repeat this procedure three times for each ethanol control. Average the results obtained for each concentration from the three runs. To record pass, the average results must fall within the following parameters: 0.000 g/210L, 0.020 g/210L (+/‑ 0.005 g/210L), 0.040 g/210L (+/‑ 0.005 g/210L), 0.080 g/210L (+/‑ 5%), 0.120 g/210L (+/‑ 5%), 0.200 g/210L (+/‑ 5%), and 0.500 g/210L (+/‑ 5%). If the instrument does not pass, initiate the necessary corrective actions to achieve the desired specifications.

(n) Breath Temperature Check. Place the instrument in “ABA” mode. Initiate a testing sequence consisting of three breath samples. When instructed to do so deliver three breath samples into the instrument from a precisely controlled water bath apparatus adjusted to a temperature of approximately 34.0oC. Repeat this procedure using a precisely controlled water bath apparatus adjusted to a temperature of approximately 37.0oC. Record pass if the instrument records a temperature within +/‑ 0.3oC of the actual temperature. If the instrument does not pass initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(o) Acetone Interference Check. Prepare a solution consisting of 500 milliliters of a manufactured 0.080 g/210L solution of ethanol and 950 microliters of Acetone in a simulator. Initiate an administrative test sequence. At the prompt “Please Blow”, deliver a sufficient sample into the instrument. Record pass if the message “Interference” is displayed. If the error is not triggered initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(p) Voltage Range Check. Verify the Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII’s performance capability throughout a voltage range of approximately 90‑200 volts AC and 12 volts DC.

1. With the instrument connected to a variable AC power supply, adjust the voltage to approximately 90 volts AC. Initiate a standard check sequence consisting of three measurements of a 0.080 g/210L dry gas standard. Record pass if the instrument records an average result between 0.076‑0.084 g/210L. If the instrument does not pass, initiate the necessary corrective actions to achieve the desired specification.

2. With the instrument connected to a variable AC power supply, adjust the voltage to approximately 220 volts AC. Initiate a standard check sequence consisting of three measurements of a 0.080 g/210L dry gas standard. Record pass if the instrument records an average result between 0.076‑0.084 g/210L. If the instrument does not pass, initiate the necessary corrective actions to achieve the desired specification.

3. With the instrument connected to a DC power supply, adjust the voltage to approximately 12 volts DC. Initiate a standard check sequence consisting of three measurements of a 0.080 g/210L dry gas standard. Record pass if the instrument records an average result between 0.076‑0.084 g/210L. If the instrument does not pass initiate the necessary corrective actions to achieve the desired specification.

(q) Barometer Check. Establish communication with the instrument in the diagnostic screen mode. Compare the barometric pressure as indicated by the instrument to the laboratories barometer. Record pass if the difference between the two readings is not greater than 5%. If the instrument does not pass initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(r) Standard Deviation Check. Initiate a standard check sequence consisting of ten measurements of a 0.080% dry gas standard. Record pass if the instrument records the following: an average result between 0.076‑0.084 g/210L and a standard deviation of less than 0.0025. If the instrument does not pass initiate the necessary corrective actions to restore the instrument to proper working condition.

(2) Data Download Review. The Test Data collected and stored by each Draeger Alcotest 7110 MKIII in the field is transferred to the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences. Upon transfer, the data is systematically reviewed to identify instrument problems and to perform trend analyses. This data transfer allows the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences to review essentially 100% of the Breath Alcohol Tests performed statewide.

(a) Communication Check. The Draeger Alcotest 7110 Data Retrieval and Archiving Program produces a Summary of Automatic Data Retrieval. The summary readily identifies those instruments for which communication was not established. For those instruments that automatic communication was unsuccessful, manually establish communication. If communication problems persist investigate the source of the problem and document.

(b) Message Check. Open the Message File (50 File) to identify the automatic Instrument Messages and Operator Messages retrieved by the current download. Review the messages to determine the needs of the instrument, operator, or location (supplies). Document any actions taken.

(c) Instrument Parameter Check. Open the Data File (10 File) to identify Instrument Parameter data retrieved by the current download. Isolate the data corresponding to each of the following parameters collected before and after the subject samples for review: Ambient Air Pressure, 12V DC Power Supply, Battery Voltage, IR Signal, EC Offset, Cuvette Temperature, Breath Hose Temperature, Breath Probe Temperature, Breath Temperature Thermistors, Flow Sensor, Pre‑Test Diagnostic Check, and Post‑Test Diagnostic Check. For each parameter identify when if any an instrument recorded a result outside the specified operating range. Investigate the source of any problem and document any corrective action.

(d) Dry Gas Configuration Check. Open the Data File (10 File) to identify the Dry Gas Configuration data retrieved by the current download. Isolate the data corresponding to each of the following categories for review: 0.02 Gas Lot Number, 0.02 Gas Expiration Date, 0.08 Gas Lot Number, 0.08 Gas Expiration Date, 0.02 Target Concentration, 0.02 Relative Tolerance, 0.02 Absolute Tolerance, 0.08 Target Concentration, 0.08 Relative Tolerance, and 0.08 Absolute Tolerance. For each category identify if the instrument contains the correct configuration. Investigate any discrepancy and document any corrective action.

(e) Error and Accuracy Check. Open the Data File (10 File) to identify the Error and Accuracy Check data retrieved by the current download. Isolate the data corresponding to each of the following errors or measurements: Error, Error 2, Error 3, Error 4, 0.02 gas data, and 0.08 gas data. For each category identify when if any an instrument recorded a result outside the specified operating range. Also review the 0.02 g/210L and 0.08 g/210L gas data to identify low or high trends. Investigate the source of any problem or trend and document any corrective action.

(3) Electronic Inspection. The Electronic Inspection serves primarily as a quality assurance role by being a back‑up inspection to the instrument set‑up procedures and Data Download Review. The Electronic Inspection also is an opportunity to evaluate instrument performance over an extended time frame.

(a) Diagnostic Screen Check. Initiate the Draeger Alcotest 7110 Data Retrieval and Archiving Program. Establish communication with the instrument through the Diagnostic Screen. Evaluate the following displayed parameters: Instrument Serial Number, Instrument Location, Firmware Version, Date, Time, Ambient Air Pressure, 12VDC Power Supply, Battery Voltage, IR Signal, EC Offset, Cuvette Temperature, Breath Hose Temperature, Breath Probe Temperature, Breath Temperature 1, Breath Temperature 2, Function Key, and Flow Sensor. Investigate any discrepancy and document any corrective action.

(b) Interactive Screen Check. Initiate the Draeger Alcotest 7110 Data Retrieval and Archiving Program. Establish communication with the instrument through the Interactive Screen. Evaluate the following displayed parameters: Measuring Units, Calibration Configuration, and Cylinder Pressure Limit. Investigate any discrepancy and document any corrective action.

(c) Calibration Check Plot. Open the Data File (10 File) to identify the Accuracy Check data retrieved by the instrument over the last 6 months. Plot the Accuracy Check data for both the 0.02 and 0.08 g/210L Accuracy Checks. Investigate the source of any problem or trend and document any corrective action.

(4) Annual Re‑Evaluation/Pre‑Installation Evaluation. Regardless of the performance of an instrument in the field each instrument will be brought back to the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences laboratory once a year for evaluation. This evaluation will consist of the battery of tests described under (1) Pre‑Installation Evaluation.
Authors: Dale A. Carpenter, Mark A. Pevey, Gregory L. Turner
Statutory Authority: Code of Ala. 1975, §32‑6‑49.13, as amended.
History: New Appendix: Filed July 7, 2003; effective August 11, 2003.

Ed Note: Appendix is attached to Rule 370‑1‑1‑.01, as per certification filed July 7, 2003; effective August 11, 2003.

Ala.Code 1975 § 12-21-300 is now unconstitutional

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts was decided today by the United States Supreme Court. This much anticipated opinion clears up the debate about whether certificates prepared by a lab technician or similar person are admissible against a defendant in trial without the witness being present to actually testify about what the certificate says.It is very clear that lab reports are produced in anticipation of trial and they are in fact “testimonial” as defined by Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Alaska. Those cases hold that the defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him and that testimonial evidence shall not be admissible unless the witness is “unavailable” and the defendant has previously had the right to cross-examine the witness.Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the court and was joined by Stevens, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy wrote the dissent and was joined by Roberts, Alito, and Breyer. The dissent argues that these reports should be exempt from the confrontation because they are not normal witnesses, they are neutral scientists. Justice Scalia does a masterful job of demonstrating what a bunch of garbage that is.
“Nor is it evident that what respondent calls “neutral scientific testing” is as neutral or as reliable as respondent suggests. Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation. According to a recent study conducted under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, “[t]he majority of [laboratories producing forensic evidence] are administered by law enforcement agencies, such as police departments, where the laboratory administrator reports to the head of the agency.” National Research Council of the National Academies, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 6–1 (Prepublication Copy Feb. 2009) (hereinafter National Academy Report). And “[b]ecause forensic scientists often are driven in their work by a need to answer a particular question related to the issues of a particular case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency.” A forensic analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure—or have an incentive—to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.”
I really like the fact that Justice Scalia isn’t afraid to recognize that many times these “scientists” or other examiners are really playing for the home team. Several other rationales for allowing this in without making the witnesses come were made by the dissent and all of them were shot down as well. This really is simple…the defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him so the prosecutor needs to bring them to court.Where do we go from here? The court gave it’s blessing to two different ways to handle these witnesses. Some states can require them in every case. Some states have laws that makes the prosecutor give notice of intent to introduce the certificates and then the defendant has to object. Either way will pass constitutional muster.As it relates to DUI cases, all blood and urine cases will need to have the witnesses from the lab there at trial. Additionally, I believe that this case invalidates Ala.Code 1975 § 12-21-300 et seq. These statute deal with testimonial evidence that the defendant has the right to confront. All lawyers need to read this case and be able to articulate the proper objections.

Thursday, October 4, 2007

Five Year Cap for Felony DUI Jurisdiction

Thankfully the Alabama Court of Appeals has finally interpreted subsection (o) of the Alabama dui statute thereby ending the confusion that some judges and district attorneys were having throughout the state in reading plain English. Their confusion was surprising given the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous. One of our clients, a pulpwood truck driver from Walker County with a sixth grade education, had no difficulty understanding it so why were the people in Morgan, Shelby, Houston, Lee and St. Clair Counties, just to name a few, having so much difficulty? I think this clearly underscores the premise that DUI in Alabama is a political crime and in that context that few public officials will "man up" when comes to doing the right thing. A sad commentary for judges sworn to uphold the laws of the state and constitution and prosecutors ethically bound to do justice. Read and enjoy!

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Jeffery HANKINS
v.
STATE of Alabama.

CR-06-0310.

Sept. 28, 2007.

Appeal from Lamar Circuit Court (CC-06-83).
SHAW , Judge.

*1 On October 11, 2006, the appellant, Jeffery Hankins, [FN1] pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"), a violation of § 32-5A-191 (a)(2), Ala.Code 1975 . He was sentenced, pursuant to the enhanced felony sentencing provision in § 32-5A-191(h), Ala.Code 1975 , to 65 months in prison; the sentence was suspended, and Hankins was ordered to serve 15 months in prison, followed by probation. [FN2]
FN1. The record and briefs reflect two different spellings for the appellant's first name--Jeffery and Jeffrey. For purposes of this opinion, we use the spelling contained in the indictment--Jeffery.
FN2. Hankins's indictment charged that on or about July 22, 2006, Hankins had driven or been in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol at or near Shiloh Road in Sulligent.
During the guilty-plea proceedings, Hankins objected to the trial court's sentencing him under the felony provision in § 32-5A-191 (h) because, he said, he did not have the requisite number of prior DUI convictions to invoke that provision. Specifically, Hankins argued that § 32-5A-191(o), Ala.Code 1975 , as amended by Act No. 2006-654, Ala. Acts 2006, [FN3] operates to limit the application of § 32-5A-191(h) to only those persons convicted of DUI who have had at least three prior DUI convictions within a five-year period preceding the latest conviction and that he did not have three prior DUI convictions within the preceding five years. [FN4] The trial court rejected Hankins's challenge to his sentence, considered Hankins to have had four prior DUI convictions for purposes of sentence enhancement, and imposed a felony sentence pursuant to § 32-5A-191(h) . Hankins expressly reserved the right to appeal the propriety of his being sentenced under § 32-5A191(h). See Mitchell v. State, 913 So.2d 501 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) . Therefore, this Court is properly presented with a single issue of first impression: whether § 32- 5A-191(o) requires a defendant's prior DUI convictions to have occurred within a five-year period preceding the latest conviction before the felony sentencing provision in § 32-5A-191(h) can be applied.
FN3. During the 2006 session, the legislature enacted Act No. 2006- 0298, which amended § 32-5A-191 . However, later in the same session, the legislature enacted Act No. 2006-0654, which repealed Act No. 2006-0298 and again amended § 32-5A-191 . The only substantive difference between the two acts was that Act. No.2006-0654 added subsection (c)(2) to § 32-5A-191 , while Act No. 2006-0298 had no such subsection. That difference, however, is not relevant to this case.
FN4. During the guilty-plea proceedings Hankins acknowledged having at least three prior DUI convictions. Later, for purposes of establishing a record regarding this issue, Hankins's counsel stipulated that Hankins had four prior DUI convictions--"a conviction dated January 1st, 1990 in CC-2004-136; January 1st, 1992 in the State of Kentucky, a DUI; then January 1st, 1994 in Guin, Alabama, a DUI; and June 15th 2003, TR-2003-892, a DUI." (R. 17-18.) We note, however, that the presentence investigation report that Hankins introduced into evidence indicates that Hankins actually has seven prior DUI convictions, and that only two of those convictions appear to have been within five years of the present conviction-a 2004 conviction for felony DUI in case no. CC-04-136, and a 2003 conviction in case no. TR-2003-892. We note that, although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that counsel's reference to the conviction in case no. CC-04-136 as being dated January 1, 1990, was in error.
Section 32-5A-191 currently reads, in pertinent part:
"(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle while:
"....
"(2) Under the influence of alcohol;
"....
"(e) Upon first conviction, a person violating this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for not more than one year, or by fine of not less than six hundred dollars ($600) nor more than two thousand one hundred dollars ($2,100), or by both a fine and imprisonment. In addition, on a first conviction, the Director of Public Safety shall suspend the driving privilege or driver's license of the person convicted for a period of 90 days.
"(f) On a second conviction within a five-year period, a person convicted of violating this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand one hundred dollars ($1,100) nor more than five thousand one hundred dollars ($5,100) and by imprisonment, which may include hard labor in the county or municipal jail for not more than one year. The sentence shall include a mandatory sentence, which is not subject to suspension or probation, of imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for not less than five days or community service for not less than 30 days. In addition the Director of Public Safety shall revoke the driving privileges or driver's license of the person convicted for a period of one year.
*2 "(g) On a third conviction, a person convicted of violating this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than two thousand one hundred dollars ($2,100) nor more than ten thousand one hundred dollars ($10,100) and by imprisonment, which may include hard labor, in the county or municipal jail for not less than 60 days nor more than one year, to include a minimum of 60 days which shall be served in the county or municipal jail and cannot be probated or suspended. In addition, the Director of Public Safety shall revoke the driving privilege or driver's license of the person convicted for a period of three years.
"(h) On a fourth or subsequent conviction, a person convicted of violating this section shall be guilty of a Class C felony and punished by a fine of not less than four thousand one hundred dollars ($4,100) nor more than ten thousand one hundred dollars ($10,100) and by imprisonment of not less than one year and one day nor more than 10 years.
...
"....
"(o ) A prior conviction within a five-year period for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs from this state, a municipality within this state, or another state or territory or a municipality of another state or territory shall be considered by a court for imposing a sentence pursuant to this section."
(Emphasis added.) Subsection (o) was amended in 2006. See Act No. 2006-654, Ala. Acts 2006, § 1. Before that amendment, it was clear that subsection (h) did not require the prior DUI convictions used for felony-sentence enhancement to have occurred within five years preceding the latest conviction. See, e.g., Act No. 97-556, Ala. Acts 1997, which specifically removed the five-year requirement from both subsections (g) and (h); see also Ex parte Parker, 740 So.2d 432, 433 (Ala.1999) , and Ex parte Boyd, 796 So.2d 1092 (Ala.2001) . The question, then, is what effect, if any, did the amendment of subsection (o) have on the felony sentencing provision in subsection (h)?
Hankins contends that, based on the plain meaning of the language in subsections (h) and (o), read together, a defendant convicted of DUI must have three prior DUI convictions "from this state, a municipality within this state, or another state or territory or a municipality of another state or territory" within the five-year period preceding the conviction for which the defendant is being sentenced in order for the felony sentencing provision in § 32-5A-191(h) to be invoked. In the alternative, Hankins argues that to the extent there is any ambiguity in the statute following the 2006 amendment as to whether the five-year requirement was intended to apply to prior in-state DUI convictions under § 32-5A-191 (or only to prior in-state municipal convictions and out-of-state convictions), that ambiguity may not be clarified by implication; he maintains that this Court is bound to construe § 32-5A-191 strictly and to resolve all doubts concerning its interpretation in his favor. Thus, according to Hankins, either approach--plain-meaning application or statutory construction--should lead this Court to the conclusion that the felony sentencing provision in § 32-5A-191(h) is not applicable to him because he did not have three prior DUI convictions within a five-year period immediately preceding his current conviction.
*3 The State contends, on the other hand, that subsections (h) and (o) of § 32-5A-191 , when read together, were not intended to have a limiting effect with respect to the use of prior DUI convictions for the purpose of sentence enhancement. Pointing out that subsection (o) does not say that "only" those convictions within a five-year period "shall be considered" by the trial court for purposes of sentencing under § 32-5A-191(h) , the State argues:
"[Section 32-5A-191] specifically requires the trial court to consider those convictions within a five year period from the instant conviction, while also implicitly allowing the trial court the discretion to consider any and all DUI convictions outside of the five year period."
(State's brief at p. 9-10.) The State also argues that the 2006 amendment to § 32-5A-191 was simply the legislature's response to the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Bertram, 884 So.2d 889 (Ala.2003) , and that the legislature's intent in amending subsection (o) in 2006 was to strengthen the statute by responding to the construction of § 32-5A-191 given by the Court in Bertram --that the only prior convictions that could be used for sentence enhancement were convictions that occurred in Alabama under § 32-5A-191 . The State argues:
"In apparent response to Bertram, the Alabama Legislature enacted Act 2006-654 that is at issue in this case. The Legislature's express purpose in enacting the statute was:
" 'to provide that a prior conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs from this state, a municipality within this state, or another state or territory or a municipality of another state or territory could be considered by a court for enhancement of the sentence of a person who is convicted for driving under the influence[.]'
"Exhibit 'C.' [Act No. 06-654, Ala. Acts 2006.]
"The purpose of the statute was not to reinstate the five year provisions into Subsections ... (g) and (h)--had the Legislature chosen to do so, it could have clearly and expressly made those alterations to those subsections in Act 2006-654 by reinstating the five year provisions that it stripped away in Act 97-556. It could also have drafted Subsection (o) to provide that 'only' those convictions within the five-year period 'shall be considered.' Instead, the Legislature--albeit somewhat inarticulately--appears to have attempted to strengthen the statute by ensuring that all convictions within that five year period, from any other state, municipal, or territorial jurisdiction, must be considered for purposes of the statute's recidivism provisions. The language of the statute has left the trial courts with discretion to consider convictions outside of that period.
"It is acknowledged that, in enacting Act 2006-654 to require the trial court to consider all DUI convictions from other states, municipalities, and territories to overcome the Bertram result, the Legislature may have inadvertently weakened the statute--but not to the extent suggested by Hankins. After the enactment of Act 97-556, but before the enactment of Act 2006-654, there was no question that the trial court was required to consider a DUI conviction, regardless of its age, in reviewing a defendant's third or fourth conviction under Subsections (g) and (h); as noted above, the five year period for a second conviction under Subsection (f) has remained unchanged. As it now stands, the statute, through Subsection (o), requires the trial court to consider convictions within a five year period for purposes of it's the [sic] recidivism provisions ('shall be considered'), but its language has left open the consideration of older convictions to the trial court's discretion. While apparently diminishing the previous requirement that all such convictions, regardless of age, be considered, the Legislature's language has allowed the trial courts to retain the discretion to consider convictions outside the five year period." (State's brief at pp. 16-18.) The gravamen of the State's argument, as we understand it, is that because the legislature has expressed a strong public policy of discouraging driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol [FN5] and because the legislature has repeatedly amended § 32-5A-191 over the years to increase the punishment for repeat offenders, the legislature could not have intended to weaken the law by limiting the prior DUI convictions that could be considered for sentence enhancement to only those convictions that occurred within the five-year period immediately preceding the current conviction.
FN5. For example, in Act No. 95-784, § 1, Ala. Acts 1995, which, among other things, increased the fine for a DUI conviction and lowered the blood-alcohol level required for a conviction, the legislature stated:
"(1) Driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance continues to be a major problem on the highways of our state and causes the death or injury of thousands of our citizens each year.
"(2) The Legislature should use whatever authority is available to it to discourage driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, including the levying of fines therefor at a level which will discourage such activity.
"....
"(9) This act should be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes and to promote the policies contained therein which are declared to be the public policy of this state."
*4 In Soles v. State, 820 So.2d 163 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) , this Court stated:
" 'The first rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature should be given effect. Ex parte McCall, 596 So.2d 4 (Ala.1992) ; Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So.2d 1301 (Ala.1991) . However, when possible, the intent of the legislature should be gathered from the language of the statute itself. Dillard, supra. Thus, where the language of the statute is plain, the court must give effect to the clear meaning of that language. Ex parte United Service Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501 (Ala.1993) ; IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Associates Corp., 602 So.2d 344 (Ala.1992) .'
"Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So.2d 1365, 1376-77 (Ala .1994) . See also Tuscaloosa County Comm'n v. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n of Tuscaloosa County, 589 So.2d 687, 689 (Ala.1991) ('Words used in [a] statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.' (citations omitted)). Moreover, this Court has stated:
" ' "In determining legislative intent, statutes are, where possible, construed in harmony with statutes existing at the time of enactment, so that each is afforded a field of operation." Sullivan v. State ex rel. Attorney General of Alabama, 472 So.2d 970, 973 (Ala.1985) . "It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that in enacting the statute the legislature had full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute." Miller v. State, 349 So.2d 129, 131 (Ala.Cr.App.1977) . "[I]n cases of conflicting statutes on the same subject, the latest expression of the legislature is the law. Where a conflict exists between statutes, the last enactment must take precedence." [Baldwin County v.] Jenkins, 494 So.2d [584,] 588 [ (Ala.1986) ] (citations omitted).'
" Hatcher v. State, 547 So.2d 905, 906-07 (Ala.Crim.App.1989) ."
820 So.2d at 164-65 .
Expanding on these principles, this Court in Carroll v. State, 599 So.2d 1253 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) , noted:
" 'Where, as here, this Court is called upon to construe a statute, the fundamental rule is that the court has a duty to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent expressed in the statute, which may be gleaned from the language used, the reason and necessity for the act, and the purpose sought to be obtained.' Ex parte Holladay, 466 So.2d 956, 960 (Ala.1985) . '[T]he fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.... In construing the statute, this Court should gather the intent of the legislature from the language of the statute itself, if possible.... We may also look to the reason and necessity for the statute and the purpose sought to be obtained by enacting the statute.' Pace v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 578 So.2d 281, 283 (Ala.1991) . 'If possible, the intent of the legislature should be gathered from the language of the statute itself. However, if the statute is ambiguous or uncertain, the Court may consider conditions that might arise under the provisions of the statute and examine the results that will flow from giving the language in question one particular meaning rather than another.' Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So.2d 1301, 1305 (Ala.1991) .
*5 " '[A]mbiguous criminal statutes must be narrowly interpreted, in favor of the accused.' United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932, 937 (11th Cir.1991) . '[I]t is well established that criminal statutes should not be "extended by construction." ' Ex parte Evers, 434 So.2d 813, 817 (Ala.1983) . ' "[C]riminal statutes must be strictly construed, to avoid ensnaring behavior that is not clearly proscribed." ' United States v. Bridges, 493 F.2d 918, 922 (5th Cir.1974) .
" 'In United States v. Boston & M. RR Co., 380 U.S. 157, 85 S.Ct. 868, 870, 13 L.Ed.2d 728 (1965) , the Supreme Court stated:
" ' "A criminal statute is to be construed strictly, not loosely. Such are the teachings of our cases from United States v.. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L.Ed. 37, [ (1820) ], down to this day. Chief Justice Marshall said in that case:
" ' " 'The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is, perhaps, not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.' Id., p. 95.
" ' "The fact that a particular activity may be within the same general classification and policy of those covered does not necessarily bring it within the ambit of the criminal prohibition. United States v. Weitzel, 246 U.S. 533, 38 S.Ct. 381, 62 L.Ed. 872 [ (1918) ]."
" 'Moreover, "one 'is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it,' Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362, 25 S.Ct. 443, 49 L.Ed. 790 [ (1905) ]. '[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.' United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-222, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229-230, 97 L.Ed. 260 [ (1952) ]." United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297, 92 S.Ct. 471, 474, 30 L.Ed.2d 457 (1971) .'
"Bridges, 493 F.2d at 923 .
" 'Words used in the statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.' Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Hartselle, 460 So.2d 1219, 1223 (Ala.1984) . The general rule of construction for the provisions of the Alabama Criminal Code is found in Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-1-6 : 'All provisions of this title shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, including the purposes stated in section 13A-1-3.' Among the purposes stated in § 13A-1-4 is that found in subsection (2): 'To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed.' "
599 So.2d at 1264-65 .
In Ex parte Bertram, supra, the Alabama Supreme Court, construing § 32- 5A-191 , stated, in part:
*6 " ' "[I]t is well established that criminal statutes should not be 'extended by construction.' " ' Ex parte Mutrie, 658 So.2d 347, 349 (Ala.1993) (quoting Ex parte Evers, 434 So.2d 813, 817 (Ala.1983) , quoting in turn Locklear v. State, 50 Ala.App. 679, 282 So.2d 116 (1973) ).
" 'A basic rule of review in criminal cases is that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of those persons sought to be subjected to their operation, i.e., defendants. Schenher v. State, 38 Ala.App. 573, 90 So.2d 234, cert. denied, 265 Ala. 700, 90 So.2d 238 (1956) .
" 'Penal statutes are to reach no further in meaning than their words. Fuller v. State, 257 Ala. 502, 60 So.2d 202 (1952) .
" 'One who commits an act which does not come within the words of a criminal statute, according to the general and popular understanding of those words, when they are not used technically, is not to be punished thereunder, merely because the act may contravene the policy of the statute. Fuller v. State, supra, citing [Young v. State], 58 Ala. 358 (1877) .
" 'No person is to be made subject to penal statutes by implication and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to predominate in favor of the accused. Fuller v. State, supra.'
"Clements v. State, 370 So.2d 723, 725 (Ala.1979) (quoted in whole or in part in Ex parte Murry, 455 So.2d 72, 76 (Ala.1984) , and in Ex parte Walls, 711 So.2d 490, 494 (Ala.1997) ) (emphasis added).
" ' "Statutes creating crimes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused; they may not be held to apply to cases not covered by the words used ...." United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207, 209, 57 S.Ct. 126, 127, 81 L.Ed. 127 (1936) . See also, Ex parte Evers, 434 So.2d 813, 816 (Ala.1983) ; Fuller v. State, 257 Ala. 502, 60 So.2d 202, 205 (1952) .'
"Ex parte Jackson, 614 So.2d 405, 406 (Ala.1993) (emphasis added). '[T]he fundamental rule [is] that criminal statutes are construed strictly against the State. See Ex parte Jackson, 614 So.2d 405 (Ala.1993) .' Ex parte Hyde, 778 So.2d 237, 239 n. 2 (Ala.2000) (emphasis added). The 'rule of lenity requires that "ambiguous criminal statute[s] ... be construed in favor of the accused." ' Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 131, 120 S .Ct.2090, 147 L.Ed.2d 94 (2000) (paraphrasing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n. 17, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) )."
Ex parte Bertram, 884 So.2d at 891-92 .
In addition, it is also understood that the law favors rational and sensible construction. See King v. State, 674 So.2d 1381 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) . In construing statutes, courts are not required to abandon common sense. See Sellers v. State, 935 So.2d 1207 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) . In Garrison v. Sumners, 223 Ala. 17, 134 So. 675 (1931) , the Alabama Supreme Court aptly noted:
"The statute in question belongs to the criminal law. It is a fundamental rule of construction that penal statutes must be strictly construed, but should not be subjected to strained or unnatural construction in order to work exemption from their penalties. 36 Cyc. 1184. On the other hand, such statutes are not to be extended by construction. Gunter v. Leckey, 30 Ala. 591 [ (1857) ]. In Huffman v. State, 29 Ala. 44 [ (1856) ], quoted in Walton v. State, 62 Ala. 199 [ (1878) ], this court said: 'While we disclaim the right to extend a criminal statute to cases out of its letter, yet we hold it to be our duty to apply it to every case clearly within the cause or mischief of making it, when its words are broad enough to embrace such case.' "
*7 223 Ala. at 18, 134 So. at 676 .
With these traditional, well-settled rules of statutory review in mind, we turn to the issue presented.
We begin by noting the extensive legislative history of § 32-5A-191 . See Act No. 80-434, Ala. Acts 1980, p. 604, § 9-102; Act No. 81-803, Ala. Acts 1981, p. 1412, § 1; Act No. 83-620, Ala. Acts 1983, p. 959, § 1; Act No. 84- 259, Ala. Acts 1984, p. 431, § 1; Act No. 94-590, Ala. Acts 1994, p. 1089, § 1; Act No. 95-784, Ala. Acts 1995, p. 1862, § 2; Act No. 96-341, Ala. Acts 1996, p. 416, § 1; Act No. 96-705, Ala. Acts 1996, p. 1174, § 1; Act No. 97-556, Ala. Acts 1997, p. 985, § 1; Act No. 99-432, Ala. Acts 1999, p. 787, § 1; Act No. 2000-677, Ala. Acts 2000, p. 1376, § 1; Act No. 2002-502, Ala. Acts 2002, p. 1299, § 1; Act No. 2005-326, Ala. Acts 2005 (1st Sp.Sess.), p. 795, § 1; Act No. 2006-654, Ala. Acts 2006, § 1. The numerous amendments to § 32-5A-191 have generally been either to refine certain language in the statute, to redefine the scope of the statute, or to increase the various fines, penalties, and incarceration ranges authorized to be imposed for DUI convictions. For purposes of the issue presented here, the evolution of the statute's main sentencing provisions is most important.
Section 32-5A-191 was first enacted by Act No. 80-434, § 9-102, Ala. Acts 1980; that Act provided, in pertinent part:
"(c) Upon first conviction, a person violating this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for not more than one year, or by fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand ($1,000), or by both such fine and imprisonment....
"(d) On a second or subsequent conviction within a five-year period, the person convicted of violating this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500) or by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment...."
(Emphasis added.) The amendments in 1981 and 1984, see Act No. 81-803, Ala. Acts 1981, and Act No. 84-259, Ala. Acts 1984, made no substantive changes relevant to this case. Act No. 83-620, Ala. Acts 1983, however, made several changes strengthening various sentencing provisions, including increasing the fine to be imposed, adding a mandatory jail sentence upon a second conviction, and adding a subsection to provide for an additional penalty upon a third or subsequent conviction; that subsection provided, in pertinent part:
" '(e) On a third or subsequent conviction within a five-year period, the person convicted of violating this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than $1,000.00 nor more than $5,000.00 and by imprisonment, which may include hard labor, in the county or municipal jail for not less than sixty (60) days nor more than one year, to include a minimum of 60 days which shall be served in the county or municipal jail and which cannot be probated or suspended....' "
*8 (Emphasis added.)
In 1994, the legislature enacted Act No. 94-590, Ala. Acts 1994, which, for the first time, allowed for a felony sentence for DUI; that Act amended § 32-5A-191 to read, in pertinent part:
" '(c) Upon first conviction, a person violating this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for not more than one year, or by fine of not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1, 000), or by both such fine and imprisonment....
" '(d) On a second conviction within a five-year period, a person convicted of violating this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) and by imprisonment, which may include hard labor in the county or municipal jail for not more than one year....
" '(e) On a third conviction within a five-year period, a person convicted of violating this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) and by imprisonment, which may include hard labor, in the county or municipal jail for not less than 60 days nor more than one year, to include a minimum of 60 days which shall be served in the county or municipal jail and cannot be probated or suspended....
" '(f) On a fourth or subsequent conviction within a five-year period, a person convicted of violating this section shall be guilty of a Class C felony and punished by a fine of not less than two thousand dollars ($2,000) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) and by imprisonment of not less than one year and one day nor more than 10 years....' "
(Emphasis added.) Although Act No. 94-590 increased the punishment for DUI to allow for a felony sentence, it nevertheless continued the five-year requirement, i.e., that only those prior convictions occurring with five years of the most recent conviction could be used for sentence enhancement.
The next two amendments made no substantive changes relevant to the issue here. See Act No. 95-784, Ala. Acts 1995, and Act No. 96-341, Ala. Acts 1996. [FN6] In 1997, however, the legislature enacted Act No. 97-556, Ala. Acts 1997, which, among other things, removed the long-standing five-year requirement from subsections (g) and (h); that Act amended § 32-5A-191 to read, in pertinent part:
FN6. Act No. 96-341 redesignated subsections (c), (6 d), (e), and (f) in § 32-5A-191 , as (d), (e), (f), and (g); Act No. 97-556, Ala. Acts 1997, redesignated the pertinent sections as (e), (f), (g), and (h).
" '(e) Upon first conviction, a person violating this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for not more than one year, or by fine of not less than six hundred dollars ($600) nor more than two thousand one hundred dollars ($2,100), or by both a fine and imprisonment....
" '(f) On a second conviction within a five-year period, a person convicted of violating this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand one hundred dollars ($1,100) nor more than five thousand one hundred dollars ($5,100) and by imprisonment, which may include hard labor in the county or municipal jail for not more than one year....
*9 " '(g) On a third conviction, a person convicted of violating this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than two thousand one hundred dollars ($2,100) nor more than ten thousand one hundred dollars ($10,100) and by imprisonment, which may include hard labor, in the county or municipal jail for not less than 60 days nor more than one year, to include a minimum of 60 days which shall be served in the county or municipal jail and cannot be probated or suspended....
" '(h) On a fourth or subsequent conviction, a person convicted of violating this section shall be guilty of a Class C felony and punished by a fine of not less than four thousand one hundred dollars ($4,100) nor more than ten thousand one hundred dollars ($10,100) and by imprisonment of not less than one year and one day nor more than 10 years....' "
(Emphasis added.) Interestingly, this amendment of § 32-5A191 did not remove the five-year requirement from subsection (f), and that requirement remains in subsection (f) today. The 1999 amendment, Act No. 99-432, Ala. Acts 1999, added subsection (n), which provides:
" '(n) When any person over the age of 21 years is convicted pursuant to this section and a child under the age of 14 years was present in the vehicle at the time of the offense, the defendant shall be sentenced to double the minimum punishment that the person would have received if the child had not been present in the motor vehicle.' '?DCThe 2000 amendment, Act No. 2000-677, Ala. Acts 2000, made no substantive changes relevant to the issue here, although it did add a subsection (o) to the statute providing for the suspension of a repeat offender's vehicle registration. The next two amendments, Act No. 2002- 502, Ala. Acts 2002, and Act No. 2005-326, Ala. Acts 2005, likewise made no substantive changes relevant to the issue here.
However, Act No. 2006-654, Ala. Acts 2006, the Act at issue in this case, was, as noted above, enacted by the legislature in 2006. That Act, among other things, moved the language in the existing subsection (o) (originally added in 2000) to subsection (p), and then added the following language as subsection (o):
" '(o) A prior conviction within a five-year period of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs from this state, a municipality within this state, or another state or territory or a municipality of another state or territory shall be considered by a court for imposing a sentence pursuant to this section.' "
(Emphasis added.) [FN7] Significant to this case is the reference in subsection (o) to prior DUI convictions "from this state," i.e., prior in-state convictions under § 32-5A-191 , and the inclusion of the five-year language that had previously, in 1997, been specifically removed from subsections (g) and (h).
FN7. We note that, in addition to subsection (o), two other subsections in § 32-5A-191 contain language referring to the five-year requirement. Subsection (k) provides for the deposit into various funds of fines collected from individuals convicted of DUI, and subsection (p) provides for the suspension by the Alabama Department of Revenue of a repeat offender's vehicle registration. Subsection (k) was added in 1994, see Act No. 94-590, Ala. Acts 1994, when the five-year requirement was still contained in subsections (g) and (h), but was not amended in 1997 when the five-year requirement was removed from subsections (g) and (h), see Act No. 97-556, Ala. Acts 1997. The five-year requirement in subsection (p) was originally added in 2000 as subsection (o), see Act No. 2000-677, Ala. Acts 2000, after the five-year requirement had been removed from subsections (g) and (h), but no corresponding changes in subsections (g) and (h) were made at that time. However, neither subsection (k) nor subsection (p) specifically deals with the use of prior DUI convictions for sentencing purposes. After examining the timing and substance of the various amendments to § 32-5A-191 , we conclude that the legislature's inclusion of the language relating to the five-year requirement in subsections (k) and (p) sheds no light on its intent in amending subsection (o) in 2006.
We have no doubt that, as the State asserts, the 2006 amendment of subsection (o) was, at least in part, the legislature's response to the Alabama Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Ex parte Bertram, supra. In Ex parte Bertram, the Court construed § 32-5A-191 as allowing only prior in-state DUI convictions under § 32-5A-191 to be used for sentence enhancement under subsection (h). It is clear to this Court, based on the plain language of subsection (o), that the legislature intended to amend subsections (f), (g), and (h) to clarify that prior out-of-state DUI convictions (both state and municipal) are to be considered for purposes of sentencing under § 32-5A-191 . Likewise, with the specific mention of instate municipal convictions in subsection (o), the amendment may also have been to clarify § 32-5A-191 in light of this Court's unpublished memorandum in Hoover v. State (No. CR-04- 0159, June 10, 2005), 926 So.2d 1082 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (table), and the Alabama Supreme Court's subsequent decision to quash the writ in that case. See Ex parte Hoover, 928 So.2d 278 (Ala.2005) . In Hoover, relying on McDuffie v. State, 712 So.2d 1118 (Ala.Crim.App.1997) , this Court refused to extend Ex parte Bertram and held that prior in-state municipal DUI convictions could be used for sentence enhancement under § 32-5A-191 . The Alabama Supreme Court, after initially granting certiorari review, quashed the writ without opinion. However, Justice Stuart dissented, noting her continued opposition to the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Bertram and stating that she would have affirmed this Court's decision in Hoover and overruled Ex parte Bertram, 928 So.2d at 280 . Therefore, we can presume that, when it adopted the 2006 amendment to § 32-5A-191 , the legislature was aware that the Supreme Court had not directly addressed and settled the issue whether Ex parte Bertram precluded the consideration of prior in-state municipal DUI convictions for purposes of sentencing under § 32-5A-191 , and, further, that the legislature intended to amend subsections (f), (g), and (h), to clarify that prior in-state municipal DUI convictions are to be considered for purposes of sentencing under § 32-5A-191 .
*10 However, the legislature's clarification of the word "conviction" in subsections (f), (g), and (h), i.e., that that word includes prior out-of-state DUI convictions as well as prior in-state municipal convictions, is the only unambiguous portion of the 2006 amendment of subsection (o). By including the limiting language "within a five-year period" in subsection (o), the legislature went far beyond what was required to respond to Ex parte Bertram and/or Hoover. And this addition of the five-year requirement renders subsection (o), on its face, in direct conflict with subsections (g) and (h), which not only do not contain the five-year requirement, but from which the five-year requirement was specifically removed in 1997. Therefore, based on our review of the legislative history of § 32-5A-191 , and the specific five-year language of subsection (o), as well as the language in subsection (h) omitting comparable limiting language, we conclude that the five-year language in subsection (o) is ambiguous, that the legislature's intent in amending subsection (o) is not readily discernible from the plain language of the statute, and that we must construe § 32-5A-191 according to the traditional, well-settled rules of statutory construction we have quoted above. For the reasons explained below, we have no choice but to conclude that those rules of statutory construction require this Court to adopt the construction urged by Hankins rather than the construction suggested by the State.
The State's first argument--that the legislature intended in subsection (o) only to reiterate that those prior convictions within a five-year period must be considered for purposes of sentence enhancement, but that it left the door open for the trial court to exercise its discretion and consider other prior convictions outside that five-year period--is easily rejected. As the State notes, the legislature did not amend subsections (g) and (h) by adding a five-year requirement, as it could have easily done. Rather, it chose to amend subsection (o) by adding the five-year language. In addition, as the State argues, subsection (o) does not state that "only" those prior convictions that occurred within a five-year period "shall be considered" by the trial court for purposes of sentencing, but merely states that prior convictions within a five-year period shall be considered. However, subsections (g) and (h) already contain the word "shall" and are mandatory sentencing provisions requiring a trial court to consider prior DUI convictions in sentencing. If the State's position is correct, then subsection (o), on its face, appears to have accomplished nothing more than mandating what the mandatory sentencing provisions in subsections (g) and (h) already required--the consideration of prior DUI convictions within five years for purposes of sentencing. However, adopting such a construction would require this Court to find that, in requiring in subsection (o) that a prior DUI conviction under § 32-5A-191 within a five-year period be considered for sentencing purposes, the legislature deliberately created a redundancy in the statute. We cannot presume that the legislature intended to do such a useless act. See Soles, supra, noting that it is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that in enacting a statute the legislature is presumed to have had full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute. Therefore, contrary to the State's urging, we cannot rule out the possibility that subsection (o) was intended to limit the prior DUI convictions that could be used for sentencing purposes under subsections (g) and (h) to those that occurred within the preceding five-year period.
*11 The State's second argument is stronger, yet still unpersuasive. The State points out that the legislature's repeated amendments to § 32-5A-191 over the years have operated to strengthen the DUI statute, not weaken it, and that subsection (o) was, at least in part, meant to again strengthen the statute by responding to the Supreme Court's opinion in Ex parte Bertram interpreting the statute as prohibiting the consideration of prior out-of-state DUI convictions. Thus, according to the State, the legislature could not have intended to weaken the law by limiting the prior DUI convictions that could be considered for sentence enhancement to only those convictions that occurred within a five-year period. As noted above, we agree with the State that the 2006 amendment to § 32-5A-191 was, at least in part, a response to the Supreme Court's opinion in Ex parte Bertram, and possibly a response to this Court's unpublished memorandum in Hoover. And it is true, as the State points out, that the legislature has incrementally expanded the scope of § 32- 5A191 and increased the fines, penalties, and incarceration ranges available for driving under the influence, and has expressed a strong interest in deterring and punishing those individuals who drive on Alabama's roads while under the influence of alcohol and drugs--a policy that would seem inconsistent with weakening § 32-5A-191 by restricting the use of prior DUI convictions to only those that occurred within a five-year period. However, the State's argument fails to recognize that for the first 17 years of the existence of the statute, all the sentencing provisions in the statute included a five-year requirement. From its adoption in 1980 until its amendment in 1997, subsections (g) and (h) both included five-year requirements. [FN8] During this time, the legislature obviously saw no conflict between its stated interests in deterrence and punishment and restricting the use of prior convictions for sentence enhancement to those occurring within a five-year period. Therefore, although the State's argument that the legislature did not intend to weaken the DUI statute by reinstating the five-year requirement is not unreasonable, the converse is likewise not unreasonable, i.e, that the legislature did, in fact, intend to reinstate the five-year requirement. As noted above, the scope of an ambiguous criminal statute cannot be extended by implication. Ambiguous criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the State, and all doubts concerning the interpretation of such statutes are to predominate in favor of the accused. See Carroll, supra; and Ex parte Bertram, supra. Therefore, we reject the State's argument that, given the legislative history of § 32-5A-191 , the legislature could not have intended to impose a five-year requirement on the use of prior DUI convictions. [FN9]
FN8. In addition, subsection (f) still includes a five-year requirement.
FN9. Although the State does not appear to argue that the five-year limitation in subsection (o) applies only to out-of-state convictions and in-state municipal convictions and does not apply to in-state convictions under § 32-5A-191 , we note that there is nothing in the statute that suggests that the legislature could have contemplated such disparate treatment of prior DUI convictions for sentencing purposes.
Applying the rules of statutory construction set forth above, including the rule of lenity, we have no choice but to hold that by amending subsection (o) in the 2006 amendment to § 32-5A-191 , the legislature has restricted the use of prior DUI convictions for sentencing purposes to only those convictions that occurred within the five-year period immediately preceding the current conviction. In other words, the five-year requirement that was removed from subsections (g) and (h) in 1997 has now been reinstated. To hold otherwise would require this Court not only to ignore the well-established rules of statutory construction, but to completely ignore specific language in a statute based on the unfounded assumption that the inclusion of that language was a mistake. This we cannot do.
*12 We recognize the effect of our interpretation on DUI sentencing. In this case, for example, Hankins has seven prior DUI convictions spanning more than 15 years. Obviously, he has a propensity to drink and drive, yet he will receive only a misdemeanor penalty for his eighth conviction. [FN10] The stated public policy of this State is to deter and punish those who repeatedly drive on Alabama's roads under the influence of alcohol and jeopardize the lives of Alabamians on a daily basis. However, the wisdom of the 2006 amendment is not for this Court to question. As the Alabama Supreme Court noted in Ex parte National Western Life Insurance Co., 899 So.2d 218, 226-27 (Ala.2004) , "a perceived lack of wisdom in a statute [ ] does not empower this Court to rewrite the statute, even if we wanted to do so." If this Court's construction is, in fact, not the intent of the legislature, we urge the legislature to promptly clarify its intent through appropriate legislation. Until that time, we have no choice but to follow the rules of statutory construction and to hold that the trial court erred in considering for purposes of sentence enhancement any of Hankins's prior convictions that occurred more than five years before his present conviction.
FN10. In contrast, for his seventh conviction, which appears from the record to have been in case no. CC-04-136, see note 4, supra, Hankins received a felony sentence under subsection (h) because that conviction occurred before the 2006 amendment. Interestingly, his probation for the felony sentence was revoked as a result of the present conviction, for which a misdemeanor sentence will be imposed.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Hankins's conviction for DUI. However, we remand this case for the trial court to resentence Hankins in accordance with the requirements of § 32-5A-191 as interpreted by this opinion. Due return shall be filed within 42 days from the date of this opinion.
AFFIRMED AS TO CONVICTION; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS AS TO SENTENCING.
BASCHAB , P.J., and McMILLAN , WISE , and WELCH , JJ., concur.
--- So.2d ----, 2007 WL 2811970 (Ala.Crim.App.)